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Clarity and the Federal Rules of Civil 




At the stroke of midnight on December 1, 2007, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure both changed completely and did not change at all. As a result of the 
Style Project, a monumental undertaking of the Judicial Conference’s Standing 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, a full stylistic revision replaced 
the existing text of the civil rules with the aim of “conveying unchanged meaning 
more clearly and more efficiently.”1 As a veteran teacher of both Civil Procedure 
and Legal Writing, I am by turns elated and angst-ridden about this change, but I 
remain in awe of those who have been so undaunted and diligent as to bring it 
about. 
I am not an experienced drafter of rules, and this article does not attempt to 
extract a long list of specific drafting tips from the work of the Style Project, nor 
does it undertake a rule-by-rule critique of the restyling. The best drafting advice 
to emerge from the Style Project has already been memorialized by the 
consultants who participated in the effort, 2 and the best critique of the restyling 
will come from the combined experiences of the lawyers and judges who will 
navigate, interpret, and apply the new language in the years to come.3 
                                                
?
 © Lisa Eichhorn 2008. Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. I would like to 
thank the University of South Carolina School of Law for funding my research on this project. I 
would also like to thank all of the Civil Procedure students I have taught over the last thirteen years 
at West Virginia University, the University of Denver, and the University of South Carolina for 
helping me refine my understanding of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
1 Edward H. Cooper, Restyling the Civil Rules: Clarity Without Change, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1761, 1762 (2004).  
2 See generally Bryan A. Garner, Guidelines for Drafting and Editing Court Rules (Admin. Off. of 
the U.S. Courts 1996); Joseph Kimble, Lessons in Drafting from the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(pts. 1-5), 86 Mich. B.J. 62 (Aug. 2007), 86 Mich. B.J. 48 (Sept. 2007), 86 Mich. B.J. 44 (Oct. 2007), 
86 Mich. B.J. 46 (Nov. 2007), 86 Mich. B.J. 50 (Dec. 2007) [hereinafter Kimble, Lessons in Drafting]; 
Joseph Kimble, Guiding Principles for Restyling the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Part 1), 84 Mich. B.J. 
56 (Sept. 2005) [hereinafter Kimble, Principles (Part 1)]; Joseph Kimble, Guiding Principles for Restyling 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Part 2), 84 Mich. B.J. 52 (Oct. 2005) [hereinafter Kimble, Principles 
(Part 2)]. 
3 Civil procedure scholar Michael C. Dorf has observed that “[w]hether the re-styled Rules 
lead to greater clarity or greater confusion will ultimately depend on how much common sense the 
courts use in interpreting them.” Michael C. Dorf, Meet the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Same 
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Instead, this article treats the Style Project’s revision of the civil rules as a 
case study to examine the place of plain language techniques in the legislative- 
and rule-drafting process. The after-the-fact, non-substantive nature of the Style 
Project’s revision is extraordinary and will no doubt generate some complex 
interpretive problems. Nevertheless, comparisons of old and restyled rule 
language reveal that plain language techniques can play a beneficial role in the 
ordinary rule-drafting process. Such techniques, when intelligently and flexibly 
employed, need not hinder a rule’s ability to convey complex content, to function 
effectively within an existing legal context, or to communicate to an appropriate 
audience. Time will tell if the Style Project has succeeded at every turn in the 
extraordinary task of preserving the precise meaning of the civil rules while 
clarifying the expression of that meaning. Meanwhile, the restyled rules already 
demonstrate that in more ordinary rule-drafting and rule-revising scenarios, 
where drafters must express new substantive meaning as clearly as possible, the 
style fostered by plain language techniques can convey detailed, sophisticated 
content effectively. 
Part II of this Article supplies background information on the Style Project, 
explaining the work of its participants and the process by which the Project’s 
revised civil rule language was approved. Part III of this Article then describes 
plain language drafting techniques and explains debates in the academic literature 
regarding the place of plain language principles in legislative and rule drafting. 
Part IV uses the restyled civil rules as a case study to examine the possibility of 
adapting plain language drafting techniques to the complexity, context, and 
audience of a code of procedural rules. Part V then offers some concluding 
thoughts.  
 II. Background on the Style Project  
A. The Role of the United States Judicial 
Conference in Federal Rulemaking 
The Style Project is an ongoing effort operating under the auspices of the 
United States Judicial Conference. The Judicial Conference is presided over by 
the Chief Justice of the United States, and its membership consists of the chief 
judges of each federal circuit, the chief judge of the Court of International Trade, 
and one elected district court judge from each circuit.4 The body is charged by 
statute, among other duties, to “carry on a continuous study of the operation and 
effect of the general rules of practice and procedure” in the federal courts.5 These 
rules include the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of 
                                                                                                             
as the Old Rules?, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20070718.html (July 18, 2007). 
4 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000).  
5 Id.  
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Criminal Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Evidence.6 With respect to these 
rules, the Judicial Conference recommends amendments and additions to the 
Supreme Court when such changes would “promote simplicity in procedure, 
fairness in administration, the just determination of litigation, and the elimination 
of unjustifiable expense and delay.”7 If, before May 1st, the Supreme Court 
approves the new rules or amendments recommended by the Judicial 
Conference, the new rule language automatically takes effect unless Congress 
enacts legislation before December 1st of the same year to modify or reject the 
approved language or to defer its effective date.8  
With respect to its study of court rules, the Judicial Conference operates 
through its Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, commonly 
known as the Standing Committee.9 This committee in turn coordinates the work 
of five advisory committees, each of which performs the groundwork of studying 
one of the five codes of federal rules and of recommending amendments when 
necessary to “maintain consistency and otherwise promote the interests of 
justice.”10 Members of both the Standing Committee and of the five advisory 
committees include “federal judges, practicing lawyers, law professors, state chief 
justices, and representatives of the Department of Justice.”11  
B. The Genesis of the Style Project 
In 1992, Judge Robert E. Keeton, then-chair of the Standing Committee, 
envisioned an exhaustive revision of all codes of federal rules “to make them 
clearer and easier to understand.”12 Indeed, Judge Keeton’s philosophy of rule 
drafting emphasizes clarity as a principal virtue: 
Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure ought to be user-
friendly. This is the prime characteristic of good rules of 
procedure. They should be easy to read and understand — as 
clear in content and meaning as it is possible to make them, and 
as crisp and readable as clarity permits.13 
To implement this vision, Judge Keeton created a Style Subcommittee and 
                                                
6 James C. Duff, The Rulemaking Process: A Summary for the Bench and Bar, “The Rules 
Committees,” http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm (Oct. 2007). 
7 28 U.S.C. § 331. 
8 See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2000) (providing that new rules transmitted to Congress by the 
Supreme Court before May 1 become effective “no earlier than December 1” of the same year, so 
long as Congress does not “otherwise provide[] by law”). 
9 Duff, supra n. 6, at “The Rules Committees.” 
10 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (2000). 
11 Duff, supra n. 6, at “The Rules Committees.” 
12 Memo. from Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. R. of Civ. Proc., to David 
F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on R. of Prac. & Proc., Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee 21 
(June 2, 2006) (available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV06-2006.pdf). 
13 Robert E. Keeton, Preface, in Garner, supra n. 2, at i. 
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recruited legal writing expert Bryan A. Garner as a consultant to assist in the Style 
Project, an ambitious undertaking that would eventually involve not only 
reviewing proposed rule amendments for stylistic effectiveness but also revising 
— one by one — the codes of federal rules so as to achieve stylistic consistency 
and optimal clarity without changing substantive meaning.14 By 1994, Garner and 
the Style Subcommittee had developed draft revisions of the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.15 However, the 
civil rules revision process was put on hold shortly thereafter following 
membership changes on the Standing Committee and its Style Subcommittee.16  
Meanwhile, the Style Project continued to focus on the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure and began work on the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.17 Revisions of both sets of rules were eventually approved by the 
Judicial Conference, which recommended the revisions to the Supreme Court.18 
Exercising its power under the Rules Enabling Act,19 the Supreme Court 
approved the new appellate rules in April 199820 and the new criminal rules in 
April 2002.21 Because Congress did not enact legislation to block the newly 
revised rules, the restyled appellate rules took effect on December 1, 1998,22 and 
the restyled criminal rules took effect on December 1, 2002.23 
C. Drafting the Restyled Civil Rules 
Eventually, the Standing Committee and the advisory committee on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure returned to the task of restyling the civil rules. 
                                                
14 Id. at iii-iv. 
15 Id. at iii. 
16 Id. 
17 See Memo. from James K. Logan, Chair, Advisory Comm. on App. Rules, to Alicemarie H. 
Stotler, Chair, and Members of the Standing Comm. on R. of Prac. & Proc., 2 (Dec. 12, 1995) 
(available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP12-1995.pdf) (describing the ongoing 
process of restyling the appellate rules); Memo. from W. Eugene Davis, Chair, Advisory Comm. on 
the Fed. R. of Crim. Proc., to Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing Comm. on R. of Prac. & Proc., 
Report of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules 2 (May 10, 2001) (available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CR05-2001.pdf) (describing the ongoing process of 
restyling the criminal rules, which had begun in 1998). 
18 See Duff, supra n. 6, at “How the Rules Are Amended: Step 5. Judicial Conference 
Approval” (“The Judicial Conference normally considers proposed amendments to the rules at its 
September session each year. If approved by the Conference, the amendments are transmitted 
promptly to the Supreme Court.”).  
19 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000) (granting the Supreme Court “the power to prescribe general rules 
of practice and procedure” applicable in the federal courts). 
20 U.S. S. Ct. Or., 523 U.S. 1147, 1147 (Apr. 24, 1998). 
21 U.S. S. Ct. Or., 535 U.S. 1157, 1157 (Apr. 29, 2002). 
22 See U.S. S. Ct. Or., 523 U.S. 1149, 1149 (Apr. 24, 1998) (noting effective date of adopted 
rule amendments). 
23 See U.S. S. Ct. Or., 535 U.S. 1159, 1159 (Apr. 29, 2002) (noting effective date of adopted 
rule amendments). 
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Consultant Joseph Kimble, a legal writing scholar, with assistance from 
consultant Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., a retired clerk of the United States Supreme 
Court, created a new working draft of the civil rules, following drafting guidelines 
that had been generated and memorialized by Bryan Garner during the appellate 
rules project.24 The proposed changes were then reviewed, respectively, by 
prominent civil procedure scholars, the Standing Committee’s Style 
Subcommittee, and subcommittees of the civil rules advisory committee.25 Each 
review by each of these groups was aimed at preserving the substantive meaning 
of the current rules while increasing the clarity of the text.26 Each group’s review 
resulted in the consultants’ creation of a revised draft that was then passed along 
to the next group.27  
The resulting version of the proposed rules then passed through the full 
civil rules advisory committee and the full Standing Committee.28 The emerging 
draft was then published for public comment in February 2005.29 After reviewing 
the approximately twenty-five comments submitted,30 the Style Subcommittee, its 
academic consultants, and the entire advisory committee again revised and 
refined the proposed draft of the rules. At that point, the restyling process had 
taken two and one-half years and “produced more than 750 documents.”31 After 
the drafters studied feedback received during the public comment period and 
decided upon some further changes, the resulting draft of the restyling 
amendments again passed through the Standing Committee32 and then went on 
to be approved by the full Judicial Conference.33 The Supreme Court approved 
the full set of restyling amendments and transmitted them to Congress on April 
30, 2007.34 Because Congress did not step in and pass legislation to block them, 
                                                
24 See Kimble, Principles (Part 1), supra n. 2, at 56 (explaining the process and noting the 
drafters’ reliance on Bryan A. Garner’s style guide, Garner, supra n. 2). 
25 See id. (explaining the process of serial review and revision). 
26 Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to the Chief Justice of the 
United States and Members of the Judicial Conference of the United States 20 (Sept. 2006) (available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2006.pdf) [hereinafter Standing Committee Report of 
Sept. 2006]. 
27 Kimble, Principles (Part 1), supra n. 2, at 56. 
28 Id. 
29 Standing Committee Report of Sept. 2006, supra n. 26, at 21. 
30 The comment letters are available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/CV%20Rules% 
202005.htm (last accessed May 12, 2008). 
31 Standing Committee Report of Sept. 2006, supra n. 26, at 21. 
32 Id. at 25. 
33 Memo. from James C. Duff, Sec., Jud. Conf. of the U.S., to the C.J. of the U.S. and the 
Assoc. JJ. of the S. Ct., Transmittal of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1 (Dec. 
21, 2006) (available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1106/Duff_CV_Memo.pdf). 
34 Order of the Supreme Court  (Apr. 30, 2007) (available at 9 in http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
rules/supct1106/Trans-Orders.pdf). 
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the amendments became effective on December 1, 2007.35 
An advisory committee note to restyled Rule 1 explains that “[t]he language 
of Rule 1 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules to 
make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent 
throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only.”36 This 
note, with an appropriate change of rule number in its first sentence, appears 
after the restyled text of each rule. 
III. Plain Language and Rule Language  
Drafters of the restyled civil rules relied in large part on techniques having 
their roots in the “plain English”37 or “plain language”38 movement. The use of 
such techniques in drafting code provisions presents particular challenges and is 
not without controversy. This Part therefore examines the principles of plain 
language and the questions raised by their use in legislative and rule drafting. 
A. History and Characteristics of Plain Language  
The early plain language movement focused on the need to make consumer 
contracts comprehensible to the ordinary citizens whose lives they would 
govern.39 Early plain language advocates emphasized the need to test proposed 
text on representative readers and to strive for ease of understanding among 
members of the target group.40 These advocates pushed for legislation mandating 
plain language in consumer-oriented leases, loan agreements, and other contracts, 
and were successful in many states.41 Soon it became apparent that consumers 
were not the only ones who could benefit from more comprehensible texts, and 
                                                
35 Id. at ¶ 3; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (providing that new rules transmitted to Congress by the 
Supreme Court before May 1 become effective “no earlier than December 1” of the same year, so 
long as Congress does not “otherwise provide[] by law”). 
36 Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 advisory comm. n. 
37 See Wayne Schiess, What Plain English Really Is, 9 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 43, 48-51 (2003-04) 
(characterizing “plain English” as “an independent area of expertise” and listing the most widely 
known texts in the field). 
38 See Barbara Child, Drafting Legal Documents: Materials and Problems 63 (West Publg. Co. 1988) 
(noting that the labels “Plain English” and “Plain Language” are both used to refer to the same 
movement). 
39 Id. at 6; see also Peter Butt & Richard Castle, Modern Legal Drafting: A Guide to Using Clearer 
Language 77-81 (Cambridge U. Press 2001) (presenting a brief history of the plain language 
movement in the United States). 
40 See Joseph Kimble, Plain English: A Charter for Clear Writing, 9 Thomas M. Cooley L. Rev. 1, 
12 (1992) (listing the following advice among the four general guidelines of plain English: 
“Whenever possible, test consumer documents on a small group of typical users.”); see also Susan 
Krongold, Writing Laws: Making Them Easier to Understand, 24 Ottawa L. Rev. 495, 544-49 (1992) 
(explaining the need to test draft legislative documents on readers and describing four specific types 
of testing). 
41 See Kimble, supra n. 40, at 2 (citing numerous plain English statutes). 
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professionals in law, government, and business began paying closer attention to 
the drafting principles developed by the plain language movement.42 
While no single expert or group is the definitive arbiter of plain language 
principles, texts espousing the benefits of “plain language”43 or “plain English”44 
tend to focus upon similar guiding tenets. Most important is the proposition that 
a writer’s “main goal is to convey [his or her] ideas with the greatest possible 
clarity.”45 To achieve clarity, a writer must focus on the reader’s needs and 
develop a sense of a reader’s likely reaction to a given piece of text.46 Plain 
language guidelines propose many specific writing techniques aimed at increasing 
a reader’s likelihood of accurately comprehending a document.47 Among these 
techniques are using logical organization and formatting;48 dividing documents 
into sections;49 keeping average sentence length relatively short;50 using active 
                                                
42 See id. at 2-3 (describing plain language initiatives around the world and noting that “[p]lain 
English is now a part of the culture of law, business, and government”); see also Bryan A. Garner, A 
Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 664 (2d ed., Oxford U. Press 1995) (describing efforts to use and 
promote plain language, particularly in American and British legal communities, from the 1970s 
through the mid-1990s). 
43 See e.g. Joseph Kimble, The Elements of Plain Language, in Joseph Kimble, Lifting the Fog of 
Legalese 69, 69 (Carolina Academic Press 2006) [hereinafter Kimble, Lifting the Fog of Legalese]; see also 
Bryan A. Garner, The Elements of Legal Style 6-7 (Oxford U. Press 1991) (explaining that writers of 
“judicial opinions, advocacy, scholarly commentary, opinion letters, and other writing in and about 
law” should strive to use “plain language”). 
44 See generally e.g. Richard C. Wydick, Plain English for Lawyers (5th ed., Carolina Academic 
Press 2005); Robert J. Martineau, Drafting Legislation and Rules in Plain English (West 1991); Kimble, 
supra n. 40; see also Wayne Schiess, Better Legal Writing: 15 Topics for Advanced Legal Writers 131 
(William S. Hein & Co. 2005) (noting that the author identifies himself in the camp of “Plain-
English advocates” and professing the belief that “clear and plain legal writing brings respect, 
appreciation, and clients”).  
45 Kimble, supra n. 43, at 69. 
46 See Schiess, supra n. 44, at 9 (noting that a legal writer should strive for clarity and can 
achieve it best by “knowing the audience and trying to meet the audience’s needs at the audience’s 
level”); Kimble, supra n. 43, at 69 (“As the starting point and at every point, design and write the 
document in a way that best serves the reader.”); Garner, supra n. 43, at 7 (“What do we mean by 
‘plain language’? I define it as the idiomatic and grammatical use of language that most effectively 
presents ideas to the reader.”). 
47 For lists of plain language techniques, see Garner, supra n. 42, at 663-64; Kimble, supra n. 
43, at 72; Schiess, supra n. 44, at 131. 
48 See e.g. Joseph Kimble, A Modest Wish List for Legal Writing, in Kimble, Lifting the Fog of 
Legalese, supra n. 43, at 151, 151-54 (discussing page-formatting, paragraphing, and numbering); 
Thomas R. Haggard, Legal Drafting: Process, Techniques, and Exercises 423-42 (Thomson West 2003) 
(discussing typography and layout).  
49 See e.g. Kimble, supra n. 40, at 12; see also Haggard, supra n. 48, at 233 (recommending that, 
whenever they have discretion, document drafters should include “more rather than fewer” 
subcategories with headings). 
50 See e.g. Wydick, supra n. 44, at 36 (advising drafters to include “only one main thought” in 
most sentences and to keep “the average sentence length below 25 words”); Martineau, supra n. 44, 
at 94 (advising drafters, when possible, to “limit each sentence to a single idea or thought”); 
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voice when possible;51 using concrete subjects and active verbs in sentences;52 
connecting modifying words to what they modify;53 omitting unnecessary 
words;54 and preferring familiar, everyday words.55  
Naturally, the proponents of these techniques assume that the writer 
understands the legal concepts and complexities that he or she is writing about, 
and that this precise understanding will inform the drafting and editing process.56 
For example, the titles of the most popular legal writing textbooks indicate that 
style is of little value if it does not convey effective analysis based on careful legal 
reasoning.57 
B. Questions Surrounding the Use of Plain 
Language Techniques in Legislative Drafting  
While the plain language movement had its origins in the desire to make 
consumer contracts understandable to ordinary citizens,58 plain language 
techniques have been adopted by authorities in the areas of both litigation-related  
                                                                                                             
Haggard, supra n. 48, at 337 (stating that “[a]n average sentence length of 26 words is an admirable 
objective for a drafted document”). 
51 See e.g. Wydick, supra n. 44, at 27; Martineau, supra n. 44, at 95; Garner, supra n. 43, at 41. 
52 See e.g. Wydick, supra n. 44, at 15-16 (urging drafters to prefer sentences focused on true 
actors and actions, such as “The court offered no reasons for denying punitive damages,” rather 
than less focused sentences such as “There were no reasons offered by the court for denying 
punitive damages.”). 
53 See e.g. Kimble, supra n. 40, at 13; Garner, supra n. 43, at 47-49; Wydick, supra n. 44, at 47. 
54 See e.g. Wydick, supra n. 44, at 7; Martineau, supra n. 44, at 85. 
55 See e.g. Wydick, supra n. 44, at 57; Schiess, supra n. 44, at 131; Garner, supra n. 42, at 663. 
56 See Garner, supra n. 43, at 4 (“Good legal style consists mostly in figuring out the substance 
precisely and accurately, then stating it clearly.”); Kimble, supra n. 40, at 17-18 (“We should treat 
precision and clarity as equally important. At the same time, we should look at the underlying 
substance, along with the language, to see if they can be simplified.”); Haggard, supra n. 48, at 15 
(describing drafting as “one of the most intellectually demanding of all lawyering skills” and noting 
that drafting “requires a knowledge of the law, the ability to deal with abstract concepts, 
investigative instincts, an extraordinary degree of prescience, and organizational skills”); Schiess, 
supra n. 44, at 159 (telling would-be writers of memos, briefs, and opinions that “[i]t should go 
without saying that you must understand the issues and the authority”). 
57 See e.g. Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Legal Reasoning and Legal Writing: Structure, Strategy, and Style 
(5th ed., Aspen Publishers 2005); Helene S. Shapo, Marilyn R. Walter & Elizabeth Fajans, Writing 
and Analysis in the Law (4th ed., Found. Press 2003); Linda H. Edwards, Legal Writing and Analysis 
(2d ed., Aspen Publishers 2007); Deborah A. Schmedemann & Christina L. Kunz, Synthesis: Legal 
Reading, Reasoning, and Writing (3d ed., Aspen Publishers 2007). 
58 See supra n. 39 and accompanying text. 
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legal writing59 and legislative and transactional drafting.60 While few dispute that 
most judges prefer briefs that dispense with legalese and synthesize legal 
authorities accurately in clear, readable prose,61 some controversy surrounds the 
idea that plain language has a place in the drafting of rules and statutes. The 
controversy rests on several characteristics specific to legislation and rules: a high 
degree of substantive complexity, rich referential context, and an unusually broad 
potential audience.  
1. Complexity 
Legislation and rules must necessarily treat complex concepts. Because of 
this complexity, Jack Stark, a legislative drafter and critic of the plain language 
school, has asserted that plain language principles “cause more harm than good” 
in the context of legislative drafting.62 Specifically, he contends that those who 
urge drafters to write in plain language base their advice on a flawed assumption 
that “the meaning of all passages of prose may be easily stated by a writer and 
easily understood by a reader” even though, in reality, the “meanings conveyed 
by statutes” are inherently “problematic.”63 In a similar vein, another 
commentator has asserted that “[m]any problems that need legislative resolution 
are complex and difficult. To pretend that they are susceptible of ‘plain’ 
statement is as misleading as to assert that such problems are susceptible to 
                                                
59 See e.g. Garner, supra n. 43, at 6 (noting that the stylistic advice contained therein is aimed at 
writers of “judicial opinions, advocacy, . . . and other writing in and about law,” but not at the 
drafters “of legislation or of wills and contracts”). The following are among many legal writing texts 
that focus primarily on memoranda and briefs and contain editing advice based on plain language 
techniques: Edwards, supra n. 57, at 270-79 (advising writers to prefer the active voice and to avoid 
legalese and long sentences); Neumann, supra n. 57, at 237-48 (setting forth a list of stylistic 
recommendations, including streamlining wordy phrases, streamlining unnecessarily long sentences, 
and avoiding unnecessary passive voice); Shapo, Walter & Fajans, supra n. 57, at 177 (telling writers 
to “[o]mit legalese. Put the action of the sentence into the verb. In general, use the active voice. 
Keep your language simple and straightforward.”). 
60 See generally Martineau, supra n. 44; see also Haggard, supra n. 48, at 5-6 (describing the 
importance of clarity in drafted documents and listing some plain language techniques); Child, supra 
n. 38, at 106 (“The ultimate goal of drafting documents in Plain English is to produce 
understanding and thus to prevent disputes.”). 
61 See Joseph Kimble, Strike Three for Legalese, in Kimble, Lifting the Fog of Legalese, supra n. 43, 
at 3, 7-8 (reporting survey results indicating that 85% of responding judges in Michigan, 86% of 
responding judges in Florida, and 82% of responding judges in Louisiana preferred text in plain 
language to text in more traditional language); Robert W. Benson & Joan B. Kessler, Legalese v. Plain 
English: An Empirical Study of Persuasion and Credibility in Appellate Brief Writing, 20 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 
301, 319 (1987) (reporting that a surveyed group of California appellate judges and their research 
attorneys rated appellate brief and petition excerpts in traditional legal language as poorer in 
content and less persuasive than plain language versions).  
62 Jack Stark, The Art of the Statute xii (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1996). 
63 Id. at 1. 
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simple, easy solution.”64 
In Stark’s opinion, an emphasis on clarity in drafting comes at the expense 
of the accurate expression of necessarily complex ideas. A drafter’s priority must 
be to strive for accuracy, which he defines as “congruence” between the statutory 
text and “the intent of the person who requested the legislation.”65 According to 
Stark, a drafter who focuses too much on making statutory text concise and 
comprehensible risks losing sight of the complexity and nuance of the content to 
be included.66 Indeed, if a drafter assumes that any idea can be easily stated and 
easily understood, he or she may adopt a “lackadaisical attitude” toward the quest 
for accuracy.67 
Proponents of plain language drafting counter that clarity, when properly 
understood, actually goes hand in hand with accuracy and precision of meaning: 
“Plain language lays bare the ambiguities and uncertainties and conflicts that 
traditional style tends to hide.”68 Indeed, Stark himself echoes plain language 
principles when he directs drafters to choose appropriate subjects and strong 
verbs in legislative sentences so as to capture accurately the complex intention 
underlying the requested provision.69 In addition, when simple language is not 
                                                
64 Frank P. Grad, Legislative Drafting as Legal Problem Solving — Form Follows Function, in Drafting 
Documents in Plain Language 481, 489 (PLI Com. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 203, 1979). 
65 Jack Stark, Should the Main Goal of Statutory Drafting Be Accuracy or Clarity?, 15 Statute L. Rev. 
207, 209 (1994). 
66 As an example of an effective and accurate but rather abstruse piece of drafting, Stark 
points to a definition of “Motor fuel” from a Wisconsin statute: “ ‘Motor fuel’ means any liquid 
prepared, advertised, offered for sale or sold for use as, or commonly and commercially used as, a 
fuel in internal combustion engines, if that liquid has a flash point of less than 110 degrees 
Fahrenheit when tested in the Tagliabue closed cup.” Id. at 212. He notes that a clearer and shorter 
definition would be “ ‘Motor fuel’ means gasoline,” but that such a definition “is not nearly 
accurate enough” to perform its function of setting a specific standard. Id. 
67 Id. at 210. 
68 Joseph Kimble, Answering the Critics of Plain Language, 5 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 51, 55 (1994-
95). Kimble has noted that the process of restyling the civil rules revealed numerous ambiguities in 
the existing text. Kimble, Principles (Part 2), supra n. 2, at 55. Among them was the use of 
“heretofore” in Rule 59(a), which allows courts to grant new trials “for any of the reasons for 
which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) (repealed 2007) (superseded text available at 28 U.S.C. app. R. Civ. P. 59(a) 
(2000)). Kimble has labeled this sentence “classically bad drafting” because the use of “heretofore” 
is ambiguous. Kimble, Principles (Part 2), supra n. 2, at 55. The word might refer to the time leading 
up to the original drafting of Rule 59, or the time leading up to the application of Rule 59 in the 
instant litigation. Id. Because the restylers had no way to resolve this ambiguity, they were forced to 
leave the “heretofore” in the restyled rule. Id. However, had the original drafters of Rule 59 tried to 
use plainer language in the first place — rather than a piece of legalese like “heretofore” — they 
could have avoided the ambiguity easily.  
69 See Stark, supra n. 62, at 65 (noting that “if a legislative sentence forbids, authorizes or 
requires, then it should name the person who is being forbidden, authorized or required – its 
subject should be that person”); id. at 69 (noting that “a legislative sentence is likely to be more 
effective if its main verb is strong”). 
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capable of expressing a complex idea precisely, plain language proponents note 
that the preferences for shorter words and sentences are merely guidelines, and 
that the inclusion of a longer sentence or a technical term may sometimes be 
necessary.70  
Stark’s criticism of plain language drafting in general apparently focuses on 
one plain language advocate who may go further than most in explaining the 
relation between clear writing and accurate understanding of substantive 
content.71 In his drafting text, Robert J. Martineau asserts that drafters should 
begin by focusing on clarity of style, even before having fully analyzed the precise 
substance of the statutory or rule provision to be drafted: 
[I]f the drafter is concerned initially with substance, postponing 
attention to style until the substance is agreed upon, the result 
will be legislation or a rule that is neither well thought out nor 
well expressed. . . . Substantive analysis and the writing process 
do not occur in consecutive order . . . . Instead, they occur 
concurrently, with the writing driving the analysis as much as 
the analysis drives the writing. The use of drafting principles 
from the first step in the process imposes a discipline on the 
analysis that produces not only language that is simpler and 
more easily understood but also a solution to the problem that 
is itself less complex and more easily understood. . . . [C]larity 
of expression is more likely to produce clarity of thought than 
the latter will produce the former.72 
While even Stark agrees that “language and thought are intimately 
intertwined,” and that writing and analysis therefore inform each other,73 the 
notion that one can attain clarity of expression before having clarity of thought is 
questionable. A better formulation may be that by striving to conceptualize an 
idea in terms of specific actors, actions, and objects, a drafter is more likely to 
keep asking questions that will eventually result in clarity of thought from which 
clear expression will flow. 
2. Context 
Rules and statutes do not exist in a vacuum but instead form parts of 
complex, internally interlocking codes. In addition, courts frequently add 
                                                
70 Kimble, supra n. 68, at 54; see also Schiess, supra n. 37, at 63 (“No plain-English advocate 
has ever asserted that brevity is important enough to override substance, accuracy, or clarity.”).  
71 See generally Stark, supra n. 65 (criticizing the plain language school of drafting and citing 
only one drafting text, Robert C. Martineau’s Drafting Legislation and Rules in Plain English, supra n. 
44). 
72 Martineau, supra n. 44, at 6. 
73 Stark, supra n. 62, at 3; see also id. at 18 (noting that “[w]riting, and especially, organizing” a 
draft provision can reveal logical inconsistencies with respect to the initial request for the 
provision). 
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interpretive glosses to rule and statutory language that then invest the language 
with additional meaning. These two facts constrain any effort to clarify an 
existing code provision or to add a new provision in clearer language to a code. 
Indeed, “[t]he legislative language game is more artificial, more dependent on 
conventions and more difficult to play than most.”74 As one commentator has 
noted, “to hope for significant improvements in the clarity of legislative drafting is 
a flight of fancy,” given the “constraints associated with drafting around the 
existing code,” among other factors.75 
To substitute clearer terminology for existing code language is to risk 
changing the legal import of the existing provision. Given that the language in 
the code has already taken on a legal life of its own, a drafter may need to retain a 
particular word or phrase — even if not the clearest — “to invoke the relevant 
case law.”76 Further, when drafting new substantive provisions, drafters must 
refer to concepts already addressed in the code with the same terminology if the 
new provisions are to interlock successfully with the existing code.77 
Even where a plain language substitution or addition may be possible, law 
and language scholar James Boyd White has proposed that the added language 
will not retain its plain character for long, thanks to the inevitable glosses that 
courts will add.78 As he has observed, “Somehow the legal rule seems always to 
be making a special or technical vocabulary, a language in which words mean 
something different from what they mean in plain English.”79 Thus, even 
ordinary-seeming words in a code provision can, over time, become terms of art 
with specialized meanings. As a result, the plain language preference for simple 
terminology is to some degree at odds with the nature of statutory and rule 
language as a jumping-off point for specific judicial elaboration.  
3. Audience  
The task of legislative drafting has been characterized as “the art of defining 
and managing an audience, the central art of using language as power.”80 Indeed, 
statutes and rules, by their nature, carry out a government’s power to forbid, 
                                                
74 Stark, supra n. 65, at 212. 
75 Steven L. Schooner, Communicating Governance: Will Plain English Drafting Improve Regulation?, 
70 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 163, 165 (2002) (emphasis in original). Prof. Schooner, however, holds out 
much greater hope for the prospects of plain language principles as applied to federal agency 
regulations. Id. (“I suspect that regulation drafting, while also a convoluted and at times contentious 
process, is more susceptible to quality control, editing, and improvement, specifically in the context 
of clarity.”). 
76 Stark, supra n. 62, at 75 (noting “intent” and “malice” as examples of words used to invoke 
case law). 
77 See Martineau, supra n. 44, at 29 (noting that a commonly used canon of statutory 
construction holds that “[t]he same word used in different places has the same meaning”). 
78 James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination 227 (Little, Brown & Co. 1973). 
79 Id.  
80 Id. at 199. 
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require, or authorize individuals, groups, and public and private entities to engage 
in all manner of activities.81 The audience for statutes and rules is therefore 
potentially broad;82 if one subscribes to the idea that people governed by statutes 
and rules should be able to understand them,83 then the audience could include  
members of the public with little education. Even if one does 
not subscribe to the notion that everyone governed should be 
able to understand the governing rule, the audience for a statute 
or rule must include those who will eventually implement and 
enforce it, and this group could include police officers, lower-
level government officials, or administrative agency staff.84  
While even plain language advocates concede that it is impracticable to draft 
statutes and rules at a level accessible to laypersons of below-average education,85 
experts differ as to the ideal audience to aim for. Reed Dickerson, in a seminal 
drafting text, suggests that the target audience will vary depending on the statute: 
“A statute addressed primarily to government officials may need to be written 
differently from one addressed to a segment of the public, and a statute 
addressed to . . . the tobacco industry[] may need to be written differently from 
one addressed to the public at large.”86 Another textbook author disagrees, 
noting that the legislative audience should always include not only the persons 
directly regulated by a provision but also the intended beneficiaries of the 
regulation; thus, a statute regulating the tobacco industry should also be 
comprehensible to “smokers and those affected by smoking.”87 To limit the 
audience to tobacco industry executives and their lawyers “is to miss the essential 
nature of legislation and rules.”88 Perhaps charting a middle course, a Canadian 
commentator posits that legislative language should be clear enough so that “a 
user who is familiar with the subject matter of a provision [could], after a 
reasonable expenditure of intellectual effort and within a reasonable time, be able 
to make sense of it.”89 
                                                
81 See Stark, supra n. 62, at 9.  
82 Reed Dickerson, The Fundamentals of Legal Drafting 27 (2d ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1986); see 
also Haggard, supra n. 48, at 50-51 (noting the potential breadth of the legislative audience, as 
opposed to the relatively narrow audiences of private-law documents); Martineau, supra n. 44, at 90 
(noting that legislation and rules “usually have vast and unknown audiences”). 
83 See Krongold, supra n. 40, at 501 (asserting that “[i]n a democracy people should be able to 
understand the laws they are expected to obey”). 
84 Haggard, supra n. 48, at 52. 
85 See Martineau, supra n. 44, at 90 (noting that aiming for comprehensibility among people 
with below-average education would unwisely “limit[] the drafter to language and concepts 
understandable by a child in grammar school”); Krongold, supra n. 40, at 552 (noting that 
“[c]omplex statutes cannot reach everybody”). 
86 Dickerson, supra n. 82, at 27. 
87 Martineau, supra n. 44, at 91. 
88 Id. 
89 Krongold, supra n. 40, at 552. 
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Complicating the entire notion of audience in the context of legislation and 
rules is the role of the court as the eventual interpreter in cases where questions 
of meaning cannot be settled among affected parties. Unlike most other texts, a 
statute “operates only by the cooperation of other minds, and . . . this 
cooperation is in no sense automatic, but a process of questioning and 
doubting.”90 Persons whose relations are governed by statutes and rules will 
inevitably read the applicable provisions differently from time to time, stretching 
the texts’ possible meanings. If they reach an impasse, a judge will read the 
relevant provisions, and the judge, too, will engage in a process of questioning, 
testing, and doubting a series of possible interpretations. For this reason, one 
guide to legislative drafting offers the following advice: 
[D]rafters probably will work at an optimum level if they 
conceive of drafting as a dialogue with a judge who has 
resolved to misread the statute that is being drafted. Imagine a 
judge’s voice in the back of your head making comments like 
“this is ambiguous, so I can consult the legislative history” and 
“besides the meaning that you probably intend for that term, it 
can mean something else, which leads to the result that I 
prefer.”91 
Thus, the drafter of a statute or rule writes for an audience whose abilities, 
motives, and interpretive authority vary enormously. This fact infinitely 
complicates the basic plain language premise that the drafter should strive to 
serve the reader’s needs. 
IV. Plain Language and Real Rules: The 
Restyled Civil Rules as a Case Study 
The restyling of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure presents a unique92 
case study of plain language principles as applied to a firmly established,93 
frequently interpreted,94 and very far-reaching95 code of rules. The lesson I draw 
                                                
90 White, supra n. 78, at 216. 
91 Stark, supra n. 62, at 8. But see Bryan A. Garner, Legal Writing in Plain English 91 (U. Chi. 
Press 2001) (asserting that drafting for a hypothetical judge is a “wrongheaded” approach). 
92 While the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure have already been restyled, see supra nn. 17-23 and accompanying text, the chair of the 
advisory committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has noted that “the age, length, and 
complexity of the Civil Rules make [their] restyling even more valuable and important” than were 
the restylings of the criminal and appellate rules. Memo., supra n. 12, at 22. 
93 The original Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts became effective in 1938. 
Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal Courts 428 (5th ed., West Publg. Co. 1994). 
94 For example, a Westlaw “citing references” search on Aug. 30, 2007, of Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 
(“Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication”) — not the most frequently invoked rule but 
surely not the most obscure — revealed over 25,000 documents. 
95 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in United States District Courts, and in 2006, 
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from this case is that plain language principles have a definite place in the rule-
drafting process and can be adapted by intelligent drafters to suit the complexity, 
context, and audience of a code of procedural rules. The charge to produce a 
stylistic revision that purports to preserve substantive meaning sets up a less-
than-ideal drafting scenario, and the restyling of the civil rules will no doubt 
generate some complex interpretive problems as a result. Meanwhile, however, 
the restyled rules demonstrate that in more ordinary rule-drafting scenarios, 
where drafters may consider both style and substance, the style fostered by plain 
language techniques can allow a rule to convey complex content, to function 
effectively within an existing legal context, and to communicate effectively to an 
appropriate audience. Further, the drafting guidelines generated by the Style 
Project, by echoing plain language principles, will allow drafters of later 
amendments to the civil rules — who will have the luxury of considering both 
style and substance — to produce language that will be as clear and precise as 
possible and will thus not generate gratuitous interpretive issues. 
A. Dealing with Complex Content 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may not be as complex in content as 
the federal tax code, but the rules do address their share of knotty issues such as 
whether a party may move the court to order an opponent to respond to 
discovery requests;96 whether a person potentially subject to conflicting 
judgments may file an interpleader action;97 and whether a party, in response to 
an interrogatory, must share information gathered in anticipation of litigation.98 
1. Managing Complex Content with Streamlined 
Organization and Subheadings 
Two ways in which the restyling amendments help readers understand 
complex content are by streamlining the organization of the substance of each 
rule and by including more subheadings. For example, Rule 37(a) describes a 
fairly complex scheme allowing parties to move for orders compelling opponents 
to respond to discovery requests and for orders compelling opponents to turn 
over information in accordance with the automatic disclosure provisions of Rule 
26(a). A side-by-side comparison reveals how streamlined organization and 
inclusion of more, and more helpful, subheadings facilitate readability while not 
compromising the precision or completeness of the information conveyed. In 
addition, thanks to cutting some unnecessary words — why should “a deposition 
on oral examination” not become “an oral deposition”? — the restyled version  
is not only clearer, but shorter. 
                                                                                                             
over 250,000 civil cases were filed in these forums. Dept. of Justice, Judicial Facts and Figures, tbl. 4.1, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2006/Table401.pdf (last accessed May 12, 2008). 
96 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. 
97 Fed. R. Civ. P. 22. 
98 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). 
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Superseded Rule 37(a)(1)-(2)99 
 
(a) Motion for Order Compelling 
Disclosure or Discovery. A party, 
upon reasonable notice to other parties 
and all persons affected thereby, may 
apply for an order compelling 
disclosure or discovery as follows: 
(1) Appropriate Court. An 
application for an order to a party shall 
be made to the court in which the 
action is pending. An application for 
an order to a person who is not a party 
shall be made to the court in the 
district where the discovery is being, or 
is to be, taken. 
(2) Motion. 
(A) If a party fails to make a disclosure 
required by Rule 26(a), any other party 
may move to compel disclosure and 
for appropriate sanctions. The motion 
must include a certification that the 
movant has in good faith conferred or 
attempted to confer with the party not 
making the disclosure in an effort to 
secure the disclosure without court 
action. 
(B) If a deponent fails to answer a 
question propounded or submitted 
under Rules 30 or 31, or a corporation 
or other entity fails to make a 
designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 
31(a), or a party fails to answer an 
interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, 
or if a party, in response to a request 
for inspection submitted under Rule 
34, fails to respond that inspection will 
be permitted as requested or fails to 
permit inspection as requested, the 
discovering party may move for an  
 
Restyled Rule 37(a)(1)-(3) 
  
(a) Motion for an Order Compelling 
Disclosure or Discovery 
(1) In Gen eral .  On notice to other 
parties and all affected persons, a party 
may move for an order compelling 
disclosure or discovery. The motion 
must include a certification that the 
movant has in good faith conferred or 
attempted to confer with the person or 
party failing to make disclosure or 
discovery in an effort to obtain it 
without court action. 
(2) Approp ria te  Court .  A motion for 
an order to a party must be made in 
the court where the action is pending. 
A motion for an order to a nonparty 
must be made in the court where the 
discovery is or will be taken. 
(3) Spe c i f i c  Mo tion s 
  (A) To Compel Disclosure. If a party 
fails to make a disclosure required by 
Rule 26(a), any other party may move 
to compel disclosure and for 
appropriate sanctions. 
  (B) To Compel a Discovery Response. A 
party seeking discovery may move for 
an order compelling an answer, 
designation, production, or inspection. 
This motion may be made if: 
    (i) a deponent fails to answer a 
question asked under Rule 30 or 31; 
    (ii) a corporation or other entity 
fails to make a designation under rule 
30(b)(6) or 31(1)(4); 
    (iii) a party fails to answer an 
interrogatory submitted under Rule 33; 
or 
    (iv) a party fails to respond that  
                                                
99 The text of the restyled rules quoted in this article is available at http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1106/CV_CLEAN_FINAL5-30-07.pdf (last accessed May 12, 
2008). To keep the columns to a manageable length for this comparison, I did not use the 
cascading or hanging indentation used in the official text. 
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Superseded Rule 37(a)(1)-(2) 
 
order compelling an answer, or a 
designation, or an order compelling 
inspection in accordance with the 
request. The motion must include a 
certification that the movant has in 
good faith conferred or attempted to 
confer with the person or party failing 
to make the discovery in an effort to 
secure the information or material 
without court action. When taking a 
deposition on oral examination, the 
proponent of the question may 
complete or adjourn the examination 
before applying for an order.  
 
Restyled Rule 37(a)(1)-(3) 
 
inspection will be permitted — or fails 
to permit inspection — as requested 
under Rule 34. 
(C) Related to a Deposition. When taking 
an oral deposition, the party asking a 
question may complete or adjourn the 
examination before moving for an 
order. 
 
A particularly complex provision of the civil rules is Rule 22, which governs 
interpleader, a process that allows a party to bring into the action persons having 
claims against the party that could subject the party to double or multiple liability. 
For example, assume a liability insurer has a policyholder who allegedly caused an 
accident that injured many people. Assume also that the policy states that the 
insurer will pay no more than $500,000 on claims arising from one accident. If 
the accident victims sue the insurer separately in separate courts, the insurer 
could be subject to several, inconsistent orders compelling it to pay the same 
$500,000 to different victims at different times. To avoid this problem of 
multiple liability, the insurer could, as a plaintiff, institute an interpleader action 
under Rule 22, naming all the victims as defendants. The court would then decide 
upon a system for apportioning the $500,000 among any victims who could 
prove their entitlement to recover under the policy.100 
Again, a side-by-side comparison of the old and restyled rule language 
reveals that more logical organization of the rule’s content, along with helpful 
subheadings, allows the reader to understand the restyled rule much more quickly 
and easily, even though the substantive meaning remains the same.  
                                                
100 For further explanation of the interpleader process, see Jack H. Friedenthal, Mary Kay 
Kane & Arthur R. Miller, Civil Procedure 804-08 (4th ed., Thomson West 2005). 
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Superseded Rule 22101   
 
(1) Persons having claims against the 
plaintiff may be joined as defendants 
and required to interplead when their 
claims are such that the plaintiff is or 
may be exposed to double or multiple 
liability. It is not ground for objection 
to the joinder that the claims of the 
several claimants or the titles on which 
their claims depend do not have a 
common origin or are not identical but 
are adverse to and independent of one 
another, or that the plaintiff avers that 
the plaintiff is not liable in whole or in 
part to any or all of the claimants. A 
defendant exposed to similar liability 
may obtain such interpleader by way of 
cross-claim or counterclaim. The 
provisions of this rule supplement and 
do not in any way limit the joinder of 
parties permitted in Rule 20. 
 
(2) The remedy herein provided is in 
addition to and in no way supersedes 
or limits the remedy provided by Title 
28, U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, and 2361. 
Actions under those provisions shall 





Restyled Rule 22 
  
(a) Grounds. 
  (1) By a Plaint i f f .  Persons with 
claims that may expose a plaintiff to 
double or multiple liability may be 
joined as defendants and required to 
interplead. Joinder for interpleader is 
proper even though: 
    (A) the claims of the several 
claimants, or the titles on which their 
claims depend, lack a common origin 
or are adverse and independent rather 
than identical; or 
    (B)  the plaintiff denies liability in 
whole or in part to any or all of the 
claimants. 
  (2) By a Def endant .  A defendant 
exposed to similar liability may seek 
interpleader through a crossclaim or 
counterclaim. 
(b) Relation to Other Rules and 
Statutes. This rule supplements — 
and does not limit — the joinder of 
parties allowed by Rule 20. The 
remedy it provides is in addition to — 
and does not supersede or limit — the 
remedy provided by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 
1397, and 2361. An action under those 
statutes must be conducted under 
these rules. 
   
Indeed, thanks to the subheadings, the reader of the restyled rule can see 
immediately that both plaintiffs and defendants may use the interpleader device 
and that this joinder mechanism has some relation to other rules and statutes. 
And apart from the subheadings, the further division of the text into paragraphs 
(denoted by numerals) and subparagraphs (denoted by uppercase letters) clarifies 
                                                
101 Superseded Rule 22, in addition to being less clear than it could be, is inconsistent with 
the rest of the superseded rules with respect to the way in which it labels its subdivisions. The other 
superseded rules, if split into subdivisions, use lowercase letters — not numbers — to indicate the 
subdivisions. The other superseded rules then use numbers and uppercase letters, respectively, to 
indicate paragraphs and subparagraphs. 
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the circumstances in which interpleader is permitted. As in Rule 37, the 
subheadings and divisions allow the reader to navigate long sentences with ease. 
Indeed, the second sentence of restyled Rule 22 weighs in at a relatively hefty 
fifty words, but it has the virtue of describing very precisely two specific 
circumstances that will not negate the availability of interpleader. Again, like the 
single sentence of Rule 37(a)(3)(B), this sentence represents a common-sense 
trade-off between sentence length and the need to express a complete, complex 
idea in one place. Both sentences illustrate that plain language guidelines — like 
the preference for shorter sentences102 — can bend in the interest of expressing 
complicated content precisely and accurately. 
2. Managing Complex Content with Clear Sentence 
Structure 
Another way to increase the clarity of a complex rule is to replace 
gratuitously confusing sentence structure with more straightforward structure 
that emphasizes the point of the legal test or exception described. For example, 
Rule 26(b)(3), commonly known as the work product rule, generally prohibits 
parties from discovering trial preparation materials of their opponents, with a few 
limited exceptions. In the following side-by-side comparison, note how the first 
two sentences of the restyled rule quickly and simply set up the idea of an 
exception to the general discoverability of relevant information (“Ordinarily, a 
party may not discover”), while the first sentence of the old rule takes its time 
revealing that trial preparation materials are not generally discoverable. Indeed, 
the old rule does not signal to the reader that it is describing an exception (“only 
upon showing”) until its sixty-second word. 
                                                
102 See supra n. 50 and accompanying text. 
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Superseded Rule 26(b)(3)  
 
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. 
Subject to the provisions of 
subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party 
may obtain discovery of documents 
and tangible things otherwise 
discoverable under subdivision (b)(2) 
of this rule and prepared in 
anticipation of litigation or for trial by 
or for another party or by or for that 
other party’s representative (including 
the other party’s attorney, consultant, 
surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) 
only upon a showing that the party 
seeking discovery has substantial need 
of the materials in the preparation of 
the party’s case and that the party is 
unable without undue hardship to 
obtain the substantial equivalent of the 
materials by other means.  
  
 
Restyled Rule 26(b)(3)(A) 
 
(3) Trial  Pr epa rat io n:  Mate ri al s .   
  (A) Documents and Tangible Things. 
Ordinarily, a party may not discover 
documents and tangible things that are 
prepared in anticipation of litigation or 
for trial by or for another party or its 
representative (including the other 
party’s attorney, consultant, surety, 
indemnitor, insurer, or agent). But, 
subject to Rule 26(b)(4), those 
materials may be discovered if: 
    (i) they are otherwise discoverable 
under rule 26(b)(1); and 
    (ii) the party shows that it has 
substantial need for the materials to 
prepare its case and cannot, without 
undue hardship, obtain their sub-
stantial equivalent by other means. 
  
 
Also within Rule 26, the provision explaining the protection of non-
testifying experts from discovery presents a similar example of the older rule 
language starting out in an unnecessarily confusing manner while the restyled 
language immediately tells readers that the protection involves a general rule with 
some exceptions. Again, the reader of the old rule must wade through more than 
half of a lengthy sentence before arriving at the word “only,” which signals that 
the sentence has been describing an exception all along.  
Fall 2008                  A Lesson from the Style Project 21
 
Superseded Rule 26(b)(4)(B)  
 
(B) A party may, through inter-
rogatories or by deposition, discover 
facts known or opinions held by an 
expert who has been retained or 
specially employed by another party in 
anticipation of litigation or preparation 
for trial and who is not expected to be 
called as a witness at trial, only as 
provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a 
showing of exceptional circumstances 
under which it is impracticable for the 
party seeking discovery to obtain facts 
or opinions on the same subject by 
other means.   
 
Restyled Rule 26(b)(4)(B) 
 
(B) Expert Employed Only for Trial 
Preparation. Ordinarily, a party may not, 
by interrogatories or deposition, 
discover facts known or opinions held 
by an expert who has been retained or 
specially employed by another party in 
anticipation of litigation or to prepare 
for trial and who is not expected to be 
called as a witness at trial. But a party 
may do so: 
  (i) as provided by Rule 35(b); or 
  (ii) on showing exceptional circum-
stances under which it is impracticable 
for the party to obtain facts or 
opinions on the same subject by other 
means.  
 
The two comparisons above, regarding the work product protection and the 
non-testifying expert protection, also point to the importance of the plain 
language technique of focusing one’s sentences on a subject, verb, and object 
that convey the real point to be communicated.103 In the older versions of the 
two protections, the sentences have the following subjects, verbs, and objects: 
“party” “may obtain” “discovery” (superseded Rule 26(b)(3)); “party” “may . . . 
discover” “facts . . . or opinions” (superseded Rule 26(b)(4)(B)). In both cases, 
the reader is incorrectly led, at first, to believe that the provisions are generally 
allowing discovery of the information in question rather than generally prohibiting 
such discovery. In contrast, the corresponding restyled provisions begin with 
sentences having the following subjects, verbs, and objects: “party” “may not 
discover” “documents and tangible things” (restyled Rule 26(b)(3)); “party” “may 
not . . . discover” “facts . . . or opinions” (restyled Rule 26(b)(4)(B)). Thus, the 
most important grammatical parts of the restyled sentences convey the most 
important aspects of the provisions’ substance. 
3. Managing Complex Content by Eliminating 
Unnecessary Intensifiers 
An additional technique that helps to clarify complex subject matter is the 
elimination of unnecessary words in the form of needless intensifiers. For 
example, superseded Rule 70 states that “the court may also in proper cases,” 
                                                
103 See supra n. 52 and accompanying text. 
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hold in contempt a party who has disobeyed an order.104 The phrase “in proper 
cases” is an unnecessary intensifier; presumably, a court would not choose to 
adjudge a party in contempt in an improper case.105 Even more potentially 
confusing are unneeded intensifiers that “create negative implications for other 
rules.”106 For example, superseded Rule 56(e) provides that an affidavit submitted 
to support or oppose a summary judgment motion must “show affirmatively that 
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.”107 Here, the 
intensifier “affirmatively” adds nothing of substance to the verb “show” and – 
even worse – may incorrectly imply that this rule requires something more than 
other rules that merely require a person or document to “show” something.108 By 
eliminating these and other unnecessary intensifiers, the restyling has not only 
made the rule text a bit more concise, but also prevented some possible 
misreadings. 
The above techniques, as well as others,109 were aimed at allowing the rules 
to retain their complex content while becoming much easier to read. Of course, 
easier reading is not produced by easy drafting. The restyling achieved this result 
only because dozens of drafting experts, civil procedure scholars, judges, and 
practitioners — in addition to those who submitted feedback during the public 
comment period — reviewed countless drafts and debated their complexities 
over a period of years.110 
B. Dealing with Existing Context 
The Standing Committee’s decision to conduct a wholesale revision of the 
entire code of civil rules pre-empted any difficulties related to fitting the restyling 
amendments into the context of existing civil rule language. Nevertheless, the 
entire code of civil rules had existed within a broader context of case law that had 
been interpreting the pre-restyling rule language for decades. In addition, and 
apart from the case law, lawyers had gained their own practical familiarity with 
the structure and language of the pre-restyling rules, creating yet another context. 
Thus, despite the comprehensive nature of the restyling, the Style Project 
                                                
104 Fed. R. Civ. P. 70 (repealed 2007) (superseded text available at 28 U.S.C. app. R. Civ. P. 
70 (2000)). 
105 See Kimble, Principles (Part 2), supra n. 2, at 52 (discussing “in proper cases” as an 
unneeded intensifier). 
106 Id. 
107 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (repealed 2007) (superseded text available at 28 U.S.C. app. R. Civ. P. 
56(e) (2000)).  
108 See Kimble, Principles (Part 2), supra n. 2, at 52 (discussing the “affirmatively” in “show 
affirmatively” as an unneeded intensifier). 
109 See Kimble, Principles (Part 1), supra n. 2, at 57 (discussing the Style Project’s efforts to use 
consistent terms to refer to identical concepts); Kimble, Principles (Part 2), supra n. 2, at 53-54 
(discussing the Style Project’s elimination of syntactic ambiguity from rule language). 
110 See supra nn. 24-35 and accompanying text. 
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drafters were faced with some of the same contextual constraints that challenge 
rule and legislative drafters working on less extraordinary projects. In some 
instances, the Style Project drafters had to sacrifice a degree of clarity and yield to 
overriding contextual constraints. In others, however, use of plainer language 
could both clarify precise rule content and allow the rules to work effectively in 
context. 
As to several issues, the drafters decided that although a change might 
increase clarity, it would also cause substantial inconvenience in the context of 
practice and was therefore not worth making. For example, the restyling has 
retained all the original rule numbers, with the exception of changing Rule 71A 
to Rule 71.1 (so as to coincide with the numbering of other interposed rules).111 
Even if some of the rules “are probably too long and others might benefit from 
repositioning,”112 a change of rule numbers would have made research extremely 
difficult, as the researcher would have to know the former number of any 
restyled rule at issue. Renumbering would also be an invitation to human error in 
the drafting of briefs and opinions and in the revision of standing orders and 
local rules, because so many experienced judges and lawyers have come 
automatically to associate particular topics with particular rule numbers over the 
years.  
In addition to rule numbers, certain phrases in the civil rules have become 
entrenched in the minds of practitioners and have accumulated volumes of 
(sometimes inconsistent) judicial interpretation. Examples include “knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief” (restyled Rule 8(b)(5)); “failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted” (restyled Rule 12(b)(6)); and “no genuine 
issue as to any material fact” (restyled Rule 56(c)).113 To replace such “sacred 
phrases” with simpler language risked causing confusion in practice or even 
changing the substantive meaning, given judicial interpretations of these terms.114 
Therefore, in these and similar instances, the restyled rules retain the convoluted 
wording. 
In a related vein, the restyled rules retain true terms of art, which noted 
scholar David Mellinkoff has defined as “technical word[s]” with “specific 
meaning[s].”115 In the civil rules, retained terms of art include “interpleader” 
(Rule 22), “discovery” (Rule 26), and “counterclaim” (Rule 13), among others. 
True terms of art differ from sacred phrases primarily in that true terms of art 
would be difficult to replace with clearer but concise phrases. 
                                                
111 Kimble, Principles (Part 2), supra n. 2, at 54-55. The other interposed rules are 4.1, 5.1, 5.2, 
7.1, 23.1, 23.2, 44.1, and 65.1.  
112 Id. at 54. 
113 Id. at 55. 
114 Id.; see also Cooper, supra n. 1, at 1765 (“No two words are precise synonyms. . . . That’s 
why it’s not fully possible to realize the Style Project’s ambition to substitute new words for old . . . 
.”). 
115 David Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law 16 (Little, Brown & Co. 1963). 
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On the other hand, while the Style Project did not change terms of art, 
sacred phrases, or rule numbers, the restyling did at times reorganize and 
redesignate information within individual rules. As the earlier side-by-side 
comparisons illustrated, arranging a rule’s content more logically and then 
highlighting the more logical order with subheadings can greatly enhance clarity 
without changing meaning. Nevertheless, in each case where the Style Project 
considered making such a change, it had to balance the potential inconvenience 
caused by the new sub-designations116 against that gain. In the side-by-side 
comparisons above, the drafters decided that the gain outweighed the 
inconvenience and thus took advantage of a “chance to set the rules in order — 
or better order — [that] may not come along for another 70 years.”117 
In addition, the Style Project found it could rid the civil rules of jargon and 
needless verbiage without affecting the rules’ ability to operate in context. For 
example, the drafters saw no reason not replace “a deposition upon oral 
examination” (superseded Rule 37(a)(2)(B)) with “an oral deposition” (restyled 
Rule 37(a)(3)(C)). Similar thinking changed “jurisdiction over the subject matter” 
(superseded Rule 12(b)(1)) to “subject-matter jurisdiction” (restyled Rule 
12(b)(1)) and “jurisdiction over the person” (superseded Rule 12(b)(2)) to 
“personal jurisdiction” (restyled Rule 12(b)(2)). Perhaps more dramatically, 
superseded Rule 8(f)’s command that courts construe the civil rules so as to do 
“substantial justice” became a command to construe the rules so as — simply — 
to do “justice” (restyled Rule 8(e)).  
I must confess that as a teacher of Civil Procedure, I have become so used 
to the term “substantial justice,” not only in the civil rules118 but also in 
International Shoe v. Washington,119 that I had assumed the phrase had become a true 
term of art, enmeshed in a context of decades of interpretive case law. I therefore 
initially winced when I saw that the restyling had tampered with the phrase in 
Rules 8 and 61. Plain language experts, however, have since shown me the light, 
explaining that true terms of art — technical terms with precise and agreed-upon 
                                                
116 Memo. from Stephen B. Burbank & Gregory P. Joseph to Comm. on R. of Prac. & Proc., 
Restyled Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3 (Oct. 24, 2005) (available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/ 
CV%20Comments%202005/05-CV-022.pdf) (noting that the risk of erroneous references to a rule 
increases as that rule becomes “more highly articulated” with designated subdivisions, paragraphs, 
and subparagraphs). 
117 Kimble, Principles (Part 2), supra n. 2, at 55. 
118 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f) (repealed 2007) (superseded text available at 28 U.S.C. app. R. Civ. 
P. 8(f) (2000)) (providing that the civil rules shall be construed so as to do “substantial justice”); 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 (repealed 2007) (superseded text available at 28 U.S.C. app. R. Civ. P. 61 (2000)) 
(explaining that errors are not grounds for disturbing a verdict, judgment, or order unless failure to 
take such action is “inconsistent with substantial justice”). 
119 International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (noting that due process requires, 
if a defendant is not present in the forum state, that the defendant have “certain minimum 
contacts” with that state “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice’ ”) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
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meanings — are relatively rare120 and are not to be confused with vague, wordy 
jargon and other “scars left by the law’s verbal elephantiasis.”121 Indeed, I have 
failed to find a case that, for purposes of Rule 8, has even attempted to 
distinguish between an action that does substantial justice and one that does, 
merely, justice. Sometimes a supposed context of precise, interpretive authority is 
simply a mirage. 
C. Dealing with Audience  
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have always presumed 
that the rules’ audience has at least some legal training; 122 since their inception, 
the civil rules have used terms such as action, claim, and dismissal without 
specifically defining them.123 This presumption is a reasonable one; although a 
party’s prospects for prevailing in the federal courts may depend largely on 
procedural issues, lay litigants — at least those who can secure legal 
representation — generally have less need to understand the civil rules than they 
might have to understand more substantive statutes and regulatory provisions 
affecting their lives. In addition, the inclusion of explanations sufficient to allow 
laypersons to understand concepts like judgment on the pleadings,124 
intervention,125 and genuine issues of material fact126 would convert a workable 
code of rules into an unwieldy textbook on civil procedure. 
The Style Project drafters have also assumed that their audience has a 
general familiarity with litigation practice, and this assumption of some 
sophistication on the part of the reader pre-empts at least some of the difficulties 
that otherwise inhere in attempts to draft statutory and rule provisions with both 
precision and clarity.127 In addition, the Style Project drafters, like their 
predecessors, have reasonably presumed that the intended audience understands 
the function of a code of rules; the rules are not meant primarily to foster “rapid 
comprehension” on the first reading128 but rather to authorize, require, or forbid 
                                                
120 Joseph Kimble, How to Mangle Court Rules and Jury Instructions, in Kimble, Lifting the Fog of 
Legalese, supra n. 43, at 105, 113; see also Garner, supra n. 43, at 184 (estimating that “common terms 
of art . . . number fewer than fifty” and citing “plaintiff,” “mandamus,” and “mens rea” as examples). 
121 Garner, supra n. 43, at 185. 
122 See Bradley Scott Shannon, Action Is an Action Is an Action Is an Action, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 
65, 88 (2002) (noting that “virtually all of the terms employed by the [pre-restyling] Rules presume 
some general knowledge of modern American civil legal practice”). 
123 Id. at 88 n. 88. 
124 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (repealed 2007) (superseded text available at 28 U.S.C. app. R. Civ. P. 
12(c) (2000)). 
125 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (repealed 2007) (superseded text available at 28 U.S.C. app. R. Civ. P. 
24 (2000)). 
126 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (repealed 2007) (superseded text available at 28 U.S.C. app. R. Civ. P. 
56(c) (2000)).  
127 See supra Part III.B.3. 
128 Stark, supra n. 65, at 208 (erroneously assuming that plain language advocates favor 
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parties, courts, and others to engage in activities so that the authorizations, 
requirements, or prohibitions will promote “the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination” of civil actions in the federal courts.129 Thus, readers of the civil 
rules understand that those rules, like statutes, may require repeated reading and 
careful study.130 As a result, the Style Project drafters could insert a greater degree 
of complex terminology into the restyled rules than might be advisable in other 
types of plain language documents aimed at other audiences. 
Lastly, the Style Project’s inclusion of judges as reviewers during the 
drafting process131 will likely minimize the chance that a critical member of the 
audience — a judge applying the rule in an actual case — will either 
misunderstand a rule or construe it in a manner unintended by the drafters. 
Indeed, the extensive review process used in the Style Project, along with the 
solicitation of public comment, echoes the plain language movement’s target-
group testing of consumer-related documents, even though a code of rules 
governing federal civil litigation is a world apart from a consumer contract in 
terms of complexity.  
In sum, the restyling of the civil rules presented fewer audience-related 
challenges than might a complex statutory or regulatory provision that would 
need to be comprehensible to laypersons. To the extent that the restyling did 
present some audience-related challenges, however, the Style Project’s elaborate 
draft-and-review process, coupled with the usual publication of the proposed 
amendments for public comment, allowed the drafters an extensive and realistic 
sense of audience response to the proposed text. 
D. Inherent Difficulties in After-the-Fact, Non-
Substantive, Stylistic Revision 
The Style Project’s revisions of the appellate, criminal, and civil rules have 
been extraordinary in the sense that their stated purpose has been to increase 
clarity without changing substantive meaning.132 This goal placed the Style 
Project drafters in a particularly challenging situation. Unlike most drafters of 
                                                                                                             
statutory text that fosters “rapid comprehension” on the first reading, even if the text does not 
accurately carry out the intended legislative purpose).  
129 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (repealed 2007) (superseded text available at 28 U.S.C. app. R. Civ. P. 
1 (2000)). 
130 See Krongold, supra n. 40, at 509 (explaining that the hallmark of effective plain language 
text “is that it can be understood the first time it is read. That is not a fair test for statute law. . . . . 
To understand a statute, a reader must be willing to spend time with it, reading it slowly, not just 
once, but several times.”). But see Cooper, supra n. 1, at 1769 (noting that in practice, “quick 
consultations” of the civil rules occur frequently, and lawyers and courts may sometimes be forced 
to act or decide “after reading on the run”). 
131 Members of the Standing Committee, the advisory committee on civil rules, and the 
Judicial Conference included judges, see supra nn. 4-11 and accompanying text, and all of these 
bodies reviewed draft restylings at least once. See supra nn. 25-33 and accompanying text. 
132 See supra nn. 1, 14-23, and accompanying text. 
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rules and legislation, who are able to communicate with the client who has 
requested a new provision so as to better understand the client’s intent, the Style 
Project participants were left to puzzle over the intentions underlying decades-
old rule language characterized by inconsistent use of terminology,133 syntactic 
ambiguity,134 and at least one failed attempted to incorporate contemporaneous 
statutory language.135 
Given these circumstances, one common reaction to the Style Project’s goal 
of reproducing original meaning in clearer language is to assert that the goal is, in 
fact, unattainable.136 Indeed, it likely is impossible to both clarify expression and 
perfectly preserve meaning throughout a complex code of over eighty rules, as 
the reporter for the advisory committee on the civil rules has admitted.137 As a 
result, the Style Project participants sometimes had to sacrifice clarity for the sake 
of preserving existing meaning and, at other times, had to arrive at some 
educated inferences as to existing meaning so as to state that meaning more 
clearly. 
For example, where existing rule language was facially ambiguous and the 
Style Project team was unable through research to resolve the ambiguity, the 
restyled rules carry forward the unfortunately ambiguous language.138 At other 
times, original rule language was susceptible to two interpretations, but one 
interpretation seemed the more logical by such a substantial margin that the Style 
Project drafters made a choice to resolve the ambiguity, acting on an educated, 
and likely correct, guess as to the original intent.139 In the first scenario, the clarity 
                                                
133 See Kimble, Principles (Part 1), supra n. 2, at 57. As an example of differing phrases that 
refer to identical ideas in the superseded rules, Kimble notes that the superseded rules at various 
places used “for cause shown, upon cause shown, for good cause, and for good cause shown,” apparently 
interchangeably. Id. (italics added in Kimble). 
134 See Kimble, Principles (Part 2), supra n. 2, at 53-54. As one example of syntactic ambiguity, 
Kimble notes that the text of superseded Rule 72(a) referred to “any portion of the . . . order found to be 
clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Id. at 54 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (repealed 2007) (superseded 
text available at 28 U.S.C. app. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (2000)) (italics added in Kimble). He then asks, 
“Does clearly modify contrary to law?” Id. (italics in original). 
135 See Edward A. Hartnett, Against (Mere) Restyling, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 155, 164 (2006) 
(noting that “the Advisory Committee’s research undertaken in response to concerns with Rule 
65(d) reveal[ed] that the original Advisory Committee inadvertently omitted a comma when 
adapting statutory language for inclusion in the Federal Rules”). 
136 See Cooper, supra n. 1, at 1763. 
137 Id. at 1769 (“Yes, meanings will change. But that is no reason to surrender the project.”) 
138 Id. at 1766. For a specific example of such an intractable ambiguity, see supra n. 68. 
139 Id. at 1765. For example, superseded Rule 5(a) required service of “every order required 
by its terms to be served, every pleading . . . , every paper relating to discovery required to be 
served upon a party . . . , every written motion . . . , and every written notice, appearance, demand, 
offer of judgment, designation of record on appeal, and similar paper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a) 
(repealed 2007) (superseded text available at 28 U.S.C. app. R. Civ. P. 5(a) (2000)) (discussed in 
Cooper, supra n. 1, at 1765). This sentence is ambiguous in its us of “similar paper”; the term could 
designate documents similar to orders, pleadings, discovery papers, and motions, or it could 
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originally envisioned by Judge Keeton140 is simply impossible to achieve. In the 
second scenario, clarity is achieved, but with a slight risk of straying from 
originally intended meaning. 
Some experts who have studied the restyled rules see the risk of changed 
meaning as more than slight, and the resulting costs as potentially significant. For 
example, Prof. Edward A. Hartnett has asserted that the restyled language at 
times changes original meaning — or at least makes specific arguments more or 
less persuasive than they would have been before the restyling.141 When arguable 
conflicts between the meaning of old and restyled language arise, some judges 
will ignore the advisory committee note that the changes are “stylistic only” and 
instead implement the apparent plain meaning of the restyled text; other judges 
will heed the note and search for the intended meaning in the old rule 
language.142 In either case, the restyling’s purpose of clarifying but not changing 
the meaning of the rules so as to minimize litigation will have been thwarted.143 
In addition, to the extent that judges rely on the plain meaning of the restyled 
language and reach outcomes different than they might have under the old 
language, the restyling will have effectively changed the meaning of the rules, 
even though the restyling amendments were reviewed and approved as mere 
stylistic changes and not as substantive ones.144 Other potential “transaction 
                                                                                                             
designate documents similar to written notices, appearances, demands, offers of judgment, and 
designations of records on appeal. Cooper, supra n. 1, at 1765. The Style Project drafters eventually 
decided that the latter option made more sense and was likely originally intended, and the restyled 
rule effects this decision. Id.  
140 See text accompanying supra n. 12. 
141 See Hartnett, supra n. 135, at 165-67. As an example, Hartnett points to the ability of a 
defending party to make an offer of judgment under Rule 68. Id. at 165-66. The superseded rule 
language spoke of “an offer to allow judgment to be taken against the defending party for the 
money or property or to the effect specified in the offer.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 (repealed 2007) 
(superseded text available at 28 U.S.C. app. R. Civ. P. 68 (2000)) (quoted in Hartnett, supra n. 135, 
at 165). The restyled rule speaks more simply of “an offer to allow judgment on specified terms.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a) (quoted in Hartnett, supra n. 135, at 165). Hartnett contends that the “change 
from ‘judgment . . . for the money or property or to the effect specified in the offer’ to ‘judgment 
on specified terms’ . . . make[s] it more difficult to contend that the rule does not apply to offers to 
accept a particular equitable decree,” as some have suggested in the past. Hartnett, supra n. 135, at 
166.  
142 See Hartnett, supra n. 135, at 169. 
143 See id. at 178 (noting “a real risk that the restyled rules will engender litigation”); Standing 
Committee Report of Sept. 2006, supra n. 26, at 21 (describing some feedback received during the public 
comment period that pointed to the possibility of “satellite litigation” generated by inadvertent 
substantive changes brought about by the restyled language); see also Dorf, supra n. 3 (noting the 
potential that “[l]awyers will continue to argue over what the old version of the Rules means, and . . 
. also argue over how much, if any, weight to give to the new version of the Rules”). 
144 Hartnett, supra n. 135, at 170 (“Neither the Advisory Committee, the Standing 
Committee, nor the Judicial Conference evaluated [the restyled rules] from the perspective of 
determining whether or not they are good rules of civil procedure.”). 
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costs”145 of the switch to the restyled language include some uncertainty 
regarding the new rules’ supersession of existing statutes146 as well as the need to 
redraft local rules and standing orders to comport with new rule language.147 
The Standing Committee has taken the position that the transaction costs 
— including the costs stemming from any inadvertent changes in meaning — are 
likely insignificant “in light of the extensive work to identify and avoid 
substantive changes, the fact that the meaning of the rules is inevitably dynamic, 
and the likelihood that [increased clarity will] reduce rather than foment ‘satellite 
litigation.’ ”148 Indeed, satellite litigation has not been a significant problem with 
respect to the restylings of the appellate and criminal rules.149 The chair of the 
civil rules advisory committee has also noted that without the restyling, “the rules 
would have become progressively more difficult to understand and use” because 
each new substantive amendment would have had to mesh with the old language, 
which was often far from clear.150 Perhaps Civil Procedure scholar Michael C. 
Dorf has the best perspective on the balance of costs and benefits resulting from 
the restyling. He reminds readers that venerated Harvard Law School Dean 
Roscoe Pound denounced the “ ‘sporting theory of law,’ which views litigation as 
a game, losing sight of the important purposes that law serves.”151 Prof. Dorf 
then observes that 
[t]he re-styled Rules aim for, and for the most part achieve, 
                                                
145 Memo., supra n. 116, at 2. 
146 Id. at 4-5 (noting that when the restyled rules go into effect, they could unintentionally 
change the relationship of the federal civil rules to the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Clean Water 
Act, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, and the Class Action Fairness Act); 
Hartnett, supra n. 135, at 171-78 (explaining the supersession issue in detail and arguing that an 
advisory committee note stating that the restyling amendments are not intended to effect 
supersession will not cure the problem). But see Memo., supra n. 12, at 20 (explaining that restyled 
Rule 86(b), which states that the restyling is not intended to disrupt existing relations between the 
rules and other law, should pre-empt any supersession arguments). 
147 Memo., supra n. 116, at 4-5. 
148 Standing Committee Report of Sept. 2006, supra n. 26, at 21; see also Cooper, supra n. 1, at 1769 
(asserting that judicial decisions under the restyled language “that depart from the results that 
would have been reached under [the old] rule language are more likely to be improvements than 
mistakes”). Further, if the restyling caused any inadvertent substantive changes to the civil rules, the 
advisory committee is free at any time to correct them. 
149 Ltr. from W. Eugene Davis, Cir. J., U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the Fifth Cir., to Peter G. 
McCabe, Sec., Comm. on R. of Prac. & Proc., 1 (Nov. 23, 2005) (available at http://www.uscourts 
.gov/rules/CV%20Comments%202005/05-CV-007.pdf) (stating that the writer initially opposed 
the restyling of the criminal rules but changed his mind after finding that resulting satellite litigation 
was minimal, and reporting that the chair of the appellate rules advisory committee has found that 
litigation related to the appellate restyling has also been minimal). But see Hartnett, supra n. 135, at 
178-79 (explaining that the success of the criminal and appellate restylings do not necessarily 
indicate that the civil rules restyling will be similarly free of problems). 
150 Memo., supra n. 12, at 22. 
151 Dorf, supra n. 3. 
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plain, easy-to-understand English. Whether they nonetheless 
lead to an increase in the very sort of mischief they seek to 
avoid will now depend on whether the federal courts also 
permit Pound’s spirit to guide their interpretation of the new 
Rules.152 
Notably, the potential transaction costs discussed above stem not from the 
Style Project’s reliance on plain language techniques, but rather from the project’s 
elusive goal of changing expression without changing meaning. Similar concerns 
regarding supersession and satellite litigation would have arisen had the project 
— while professing not to change meaning — replaced the old rule language 
with a newer version in Middle English, or iambic pentameter, or text-message-
style abbreviations. Fortunately, these specific concerns need not plague more 
ordinary rule-drafting projects, in which drafters have the intent to change or add 
to substantive meaning and may do so in as clear a style as the content, the legal 
context, and the needs of the audience will permit. And as demonstrated in the 
earlier side-by-side comparisons of old and restyled civil rule language, plain 
language techniques can greatly aid drafters in communicating complex ideas 
within an existing legal context to demanding audiences.  
E. What the Future Holds 
Having seized a unique opportunity to clarify the entire code of civil rules, 
the Style Project drafters have not only made today’s rules easier to comprehend 
but have also paved the way for clearer drafting of future substantive rule 
amendments. Rather than becoming “progressively more difficult to 
understand,”153 the civil rules are likely to retain the clarity of the restyled 
language because substantive amendments will no longer have to mesh with the 
convoluted sentence structure and ineffective word choice of the pre-restyling 
language. In addition, the Style Project has generated, as a by-product, some 
excellent guidance on plain language techniques.154 This guidance can aid drafters 
not only of future federal rule amendments but also any of rule or statutory 
provision. The dissemination of this guidance throughout the American legal 
community may prove as valuable as the actual restyling of the civil rules 
themselves. 
IV. Conclusion 
The Style Project has taken on the mind-bending task of clarifying the 
language of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without changing their meaning. 
Plain language drafting techniques have allowed the restyling to accomplish the 
first part of this charge; the restyled rules are decidedly clearer, thanks to more 
                                                
152 Id. 
153 See supra n. 150 and accompanying text. 
154 See generally Garner, supra n. 2; Kimble, Principles (Part 1), supra n. 2; Kimble, Principles (Part 
2), supra n. 2; Kimble, Lessons in Drafting, supra n. 2. 
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effective organization, sentence structure, and word choice, among other 
changes. Whether the Style Project has satisfied the second part of the charge — 
not changing original meaning — will depend in large part on whether courts, in 
interpreting the new language, apply common sense and the spirit of the advisory 
committee note following each restyled rule.155 Whether the courts do so or not, 
the restyling, as a case study, demonstrates that plain language techniques can 
allow drafters to meet the sophisticated demands that complex content, legal 
context, and a varied audience place upon a code of procedural rules.  
 
 
                                                
155 See supra n. 36 and accompanying text. 
